Previous studies [Carslaw (1988) , Thomas (1989) and Niskanen and Keloharju (2000) ] have
this threshold-induced behaviour exist. According to Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) , this type of earnings management is inspired by the fact that stakeholders (e.g. potential investors) use "rules of thumb" (e.g. the aforementioned thresholds) for the evaluation of firms' performance.
Consequently, not meeting targets may be very costly (e.g. a decline in the value of the firm's shares). Moreover, it is possible that managers' compensation (e.g. the allowance of a bonus) is linked to meeting certain targets (e.g. the aforementioned thresholds). Numerous studies [e.g. Healy (1985) , Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995) , Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) and Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999) ] have shown that such earningsbased bonus plans might induce earnings management.
Loss aversion is inspired by the important psychological difference that exists between positive and negative earnings figures (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999) . Due to the latter, a profit of 500 GBP will be perceived as abnormally larger than a loss of 1,000 GBP. As a result of a quite similar psychological effect, an earnings figure of 5 million GBP will be perceived as abnormally larger than an earnings figure of 4,998,500 GBP, whereas the difference only amounts to a marginal 1,500 GBP in both cases. The latter effect might be explained by the fact that users of financial statements use so-called 'cognitive reference points' (i.e. they will summarize earnings figures as follows: N * 10 k , where N = the first digit of the earnings figure) to evaluate firms' performance (Niskanen and Keloharju, 2000) . In view of this, Carslaw (1988) , Thomas (1989) and Niskanen and Keloharju (2000) investigated whether managers tend to round up the first digits of their reported earnings in an attempt to influence perceptions of financial statement users. In general, results obtained in these studies suggested this type of behaviour. The aim of the present study is to investigate this type of behaviour for a sample of U.K. listed companies. Moreover, we introduce discretionary accruals (henceforth DACC), a popular proxy for earnings management in the literature, in this type of study in an attempt to (1) determine to what extent DACC are used to round up earnings; and (2) increase the power of the tests used in the previous studies.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief overview of the previous literature on the phenomenon of earnings enhancement. The hypotheses development and the sample selection procedures are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, the empirical results are provided. Conclusions are presented in Section 5. Carslaw (1988) (Carslaw, 1988: 322 (Niskanen and Keloharju, 2000) . The results obtained in this study are again supportive of roundingup behaviour. Particularly strange about the results obtained by Niskanen and Keloharju is that they differ from the results obtained in the two aforementioned studies in at least two ways: (1) Niskanen and Keloharju found significantly fewer sixes and sevens as second digit than would be expected in a random sample, whereas no statistically significant anomalies in frequencies were noted for eights and nines; and (2) they reported a statistically significant higher incidence of both zeros and ones as second digit than would normally be expected. In other words, the results of Niskanen and Keloharju suggest that Finnish companies go even further when it comes to the enhancement of earnings figures and that they do not limit themselves to rounding up nines into zeros. The latter is not consistent with ex ante expectations based on the Finnish institutional setting.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
Hypotheses Development
Similar to Carslaw (1988) , Thomas (1989) and Niskanen and Keloharju (2000) , we predict a higher (lower) than expected incidence of low (high) digits in the second position for reported earnings, inspired by earnings enhancement (i.e. in the current study we will solely focus on positive earnings figures). Therefore, we test the following hypothesis:
H1: There will be an abnormally higher (lower) than expected occurrence of low (high) digits in the second position for reported earnings.
To the extent that observed abnormal frequencies of certain digits as second digit in reported earnings are really due to earnings enhancement, elimination of these 'enhancements' should result in the elimination of the observed abnormalities. Earnings enhancement can be considered as a specific form of earnings management and therefore DACC (i.e. a popular proxy for earnings management in the literature) will be used to eliminate these enhancements from reported earnings. Earnings management can then be defined as "(…) a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (…)" (Schipper, 1989: 92) . It has to be clear that we solely focus on pure financial reporting decisions that fall within GAAP (i.e. discretionary accounting choices), which clearly differ from both financial statement fraud and real operating decisions (e.g. the timing of an asset sale) (Peasnell et al., 2000) .
We focus on the former because it is obvious that pure financial reporting typically investigated in the literature: (1) earnings-based compensation plans (see Section 1); (2) (binding) accounting-based debt covenants [Healy and Palepu (1990) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) ]; (3) earnings thresholds (see Section 1); (4) political costs [Daley and Vigeland (1983) and Cahan (1992) ]; (5) fierce trade union activity [Liberty and Zimmerman (1986) , DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991) , Mautz and Richardson (1992) and Konings, Labro and Roodhooft (1998) ]; (6) taxation [Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1992) , Guenther (1994) , Maydew (1997) , Roubi and Richardson (1998) and Yin and Cheng (2000)]; and (7) executive changes [Strong and Meyer (1987) , DeAngelo (1988) and Pourciau (1993) ]. Consequently, the elimination of DACC from companies' reported earnings will not only result in the elimination of rounding-up behaviour. Given the nature of earnings enhancement, we consider it to be most likely that DACC are, at first, set in view of the aforementioned incentives and that the resulting earnings figure is then rounded up by means of an additional correction to DACC. Based on these considerations, we do expect that observed abnormalities in the distribution of certain digits, as second digit in reported earnings, will no longer occur when considering earnings before DACC (henceforth EBDACC).
The elimination of earnings management should clear out all observed anomalies with regard to digital frequencies. Thus,
H2:
No abnormal pattern in the frequencies of second digits will be found for EBDACC.
Sample Selection
All accounting data used in the present study were obtained from the Worldscope section of Bureau van Dijk's Global Researcher CD-rom, which contains financial statement data for companies that are listed on a stock exchange. From this database we selected all U.K. companies. All financial institutions were eliminated from the sample due to the fact that the estimation of DACC is problematic for these firms. We limited our sample to earnings figures for the accounting year 1998 and eliminated all companies:
(1) that reported a loss for this particular accounting year [as mentioned 
Measuring DACC
We used both the Jones model (1991) and the modified Jones model as proposed by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) to estimate DACC. In fact, both models estimate non-discretionary accruals (henceforth NDACC) and then subtract them from total accruals (henceforth TACC) in order to arrive at the amount of discretionary accruals.
The Jones model estimates NDACC in the following manner:
where T = the event year; NDACC = NDACC scaled by lagged total assets; A = total assets; ∆REV = change in revenues scaled by lagged total assets; PPE = gross property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets; and α 1, α 2, α 3 = firm-specific parameters.
Estimates of the firm-specific parameters α 1, α 2 and α 3 are generated using the following model in the estimation period:
TACC t = a 1 (1/A t-1 ) + a 2 (∆REV t ) + a 3 (PPE t ) + υ t , (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995: 198) .
Estimating Expected Frequencies for Second Digits
Analogous to Carslaw (1988) , Thomas (1989) and Niskanen and Keloharju (2000) , expected frequencies for the second digit in reported earnings were estimated using Benford's Law i and the normalised Z-statistic was used to evaluate the significance of differences noted between actual and expected frequencies (see Table 1 and observed as second digit by chance (see Table 1 ). This is referred to as 
RESULTS
The anomaly in the frequencies of both low and high digits in the second position was only found to exist for pre-tax income in our sample of companies. All other earnings measures investigated in the current study did not show the irregularity searched for. It has to be noted that both earnings before interest and taxes and operating income showed a significantly lower than expected incidence of nines as second digit (statistically significant at the 5% level in both cases). However, the latter was not supported by a compensating (statistically significant) higher than expected occurrence of zeros in the second position. Therefore, only results for pre-tax income will be reported here (see Table 1 ) and the remainder of the study will focus on that particular earnings measure. Firstly, Benford's Law does not apply to our sample companies' pre-tax income, which can be considered as an indication of earnings management.
Earnings that are not influenced by human thought (i.e. unmanaged)
should follow Benford's Law. Secondly, the obtained results seem to indicate that sample companies tend to round up pre-tax income, in a way that increases the first digit by one, when they are faced with a nine as second digit in this particular earnings measure. In general, results are consistent with H1 and are very similar to the results obtained by Carslaw (1987) and Thomas (1988) . An alternative explanation for the obtained results might be were noted as second digit in companies' pre-tax income than would normally be expected based on Benford's Law (statistically significant at the 5% level in both cases); and (2) no other statistically significant differences were noted between actual and expected frequencies.
In order to test H2, EBDACC (i.e. pre-tax income before DACC) had to be calculated. Both DACC as estimated by the original and the modified Jones model were used for this purpose. Then, the frequencies of second digits were analysed for both EBDACC measures. Both measures generated similar results and therefore only those obtained for EBDACC based on the Jones model will be discussed in full. These results are presented in Table   2 . 
CONCLUSION
The main conclusions and contributions of the current study can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we document the existence of 'earnings rounding-up behaviour' for a sample of U.K. companies. The results presented in this study indicate that managers of U.K. listed companies tend to round up their reported pre-tax income, in a way that increases the first digit by one, when they are faced with a nine in the second position for this particular earnings measure. This finding is consistent with results obtained in other studies for other countries [Carslaw (1988) 
